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1 Introduction
Economic literature is paying increasing attention to the impact of network struc-
tures on economic and social situations. A network consists of nodes and edges. With
different degrees of crispness and to a more or less conspicuous extent, such struc-
tures underlie a huge variety of situations in different fields.1 Abstracting away the
nature of its nodes and its edges (individuals and friendships, towns and connecting
roads/trains/flights; species and trophic interactions; firms, banks or countries and
commercial or financial relations,...), the mathematical skeleton of a network is a
graph, an object that is both simple (it is described by a matrix) and extremely com-
plex (thatmatrixmay be huge). This has led to the development of tools for interpreting
the complex network structures that arise in different contexts. A different line of the-
oretical research addresses the question of how networks form, perform and stabilize.
This line of research is attracting considerable attention with significant contributions
in the economic literature, among them the two basic models of strategic network
formation. In Jackson and Wolinsky’s (1996) connections model, pairs of individuals
may agree to form links, thus forming a network through which information (or some
other good) flows. The benefit that such a network brings to an individual is the value
of the information or other goods received through it, minus the cost of the links that
he/she pays for. In contrast with this bilateral model of link-formation, Bala and Goyal
(2000a) introduce a model where links can be formed unilaterally by any player, with
two variants: the one-way flow model, where the flow through a link runs towards a
player only if he/she supports it, and the two-way flow model, where the flow runs in
both directions irrespective of which player supports the link. In these three models
the creation of a link entails positive externalities as it contributes to easing the flow
through the network.
In the simplest variants of the seminal models, efficient networks are easily charac-
terized and conditions for their stability established. Efficient/stable structures prove
to be simple and entirely different in each model (e.g., wheels, trees, stars). This is at
once interesting (“emblematic” structures arise from simple models of network for-
mation) and insufficient (in the real world, much more complex network structures
occur). It should be emphasized that none of these basic models was tailored to fit
any particular or specific situation of an economic or other nature. Nevertheless, they
have been and continue to be instrumental in many applied works. Also, as a result
of this combination of appeal and insufficiency, these models have been extended in
different directions2 always taking each one as a starting point. In contrast with these
extensions, the originality of this research project lies in addressing the provision and
study of “transitional” models which in some sense “bridge the gap” between the
basic models. The motivation is manifold. These basic models represent “extreme”
cases in a sense. Depending on the model, the formation of a link is either the result
of collaboration between two agents or that of an individual decision. This does not
cover situations where both options are feasible. In general terms, if links represent
1 Economics, of course, but also in Physics, Biology, Neurology, Medicine, Computer Science and Soci-
ology.
2 See Goyal (2007), Jackson (2008) and Vega-Redondo (2007) and references therein.
123
SERIEs (2016) 7:257–278 259
channels of transmission of any sort, it makes sense to consider situations where both
options are feasible. It seems natural then to assume that the transmission through
links that result from collaboration is better than through those created unilaterally.
The quality of an imperfect transmission can be interpreted in two ways: as the effect
of friction or “decay”, when only a fraction of the information at one node reaches the
other, or as the level of “reliability”, i.e., the probability that the information at one
node reaches the other.3
In other words, is it possible to unify at least partially the seminal models? If so,
which structures are efficient and/or stable in such intermediate models? What is the
impact of assuming both unilateral and bilateral formation of links to be feasible?
Are the basic models robust w.r.t. these modifications? Is it possible to augment the
repertoire of admissible actions and still keep the model tractable?4 This paper is a
small contribution in this line of research in the wake of these benchmark models. In
two previous papers we have studied two transitional models. Olaizola and Valenciano
(2014) introduces a model that integrates Bala and Goyal’s one-way and two-way flow
models without decay as particular extreme cases of a more general one. Olaizola and
Valenciano (2015a) provides a new hybrid model which has a variant of Jackson and
Wolinsky’s connections model without decay and Bala and Goyal’s two-way flow
model as extreme cases. The point of this paper is to complete the “triangle”, i.e. to
provide and study a transitional model between the remaining pair: the variant of Jack-
son and Wolinsky’s model without decay and Bala and Goyal’s one-way flow model
as extreme cases. To achieve this we assume that a link resulting from collaboration
of two agents provides a better channel of transmission than a link sponsored by only
one agent. As this “side” of the triangle has a common “vertex” with that studied in
Olaizola and Valenciano (2015a), i.e. Jackson and Wolinsky’s model without decay,
this transition provides a point of comparison with the results for efficiency, stabil-
ity, and dynamics in that transitional model. In particular, this evidences the different
impact on efficiency and stability of assuming the feasibility of different types of uni-
lateral link—undirected and directed—giving rise to different externalities. To shorten
the paper by avoiding redundancies whenever the results essentially coincide we omit
the proofs and emphasize the differences.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews Jackson andWolin-
sky’s (1996) connections model of network formation and Bala and Goyal’s (2000a)
one-way and two-way flow models. Section 3 briefly presents the models that bridge
the gap between any two of these. The rest of the paper concentrates on the model
bridging Jackson and Wolinsky’s (1996) connections model and Bala and Goyal’s
(2000a) one-way flow model. The questions of efficiency and stability in this model
are addressed in Sects. 4 and 5 respectively. Section 6 is devoted to dynamics. Finally,
Sect. 7 summarizes the main conclusions and indicates some lines of further research.
3 The first interpretation is assumed in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and in Bala and Goyal (2000a). The
second one is explored in Bala and Goyal (2000b). The first interpretation is prevalent in the literature and
is the one adopted here.
4 It is fairly easy to enrich the basic models in many different ways. The difficulty is that the model very
soon becomes intractable.
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2 Three strategic models of network formation
Following Jackson andWolinsky (1996) andBala andGoyal (2000a), in fact rephrasing
them in order to bridge the gap between different link-formation models, consider a
scenario where individuals may invest in links with other individuals, thus creating a
network. Namely, let N be the set of agents or players5 who may form links with one
another. A map gi : N\{i} → {0, 1} specifies the links invested in by player i and is
referred to as a strategy of player i . We write gi j := gi ( j), and gi j = 1 (gi j = 0)
means that i invests (does not invest) to form a link with j . Gi := {0, 1}N\{i} denotes
the set of i’s strategies and GN = G1 × G2 × · · · × Gn the set of strategy profiles.
Each strategy profile g ∈ GN determines a directed graph6 of invested links. When
gi j = g ji = 1, i.e. both players invest in a link, we say that i and j support, or are
connected by, a strong link; when only one, say i , invests in it we say that i and j are
connected by a weak link supported by i .
Let g be a strategy profile representing players’ link-investments, then g∗ denotes
the associated graph representing the actual network that results from g. Different
assumptions lead to different specifications of g∗, but generally the following assump-
tions are made: (1) investing in a link entails a cost c > 07; (2) the player at each node
has a particular type of information or other good8 of value 1 to any other player who
receives it intact9; (3) if g is the strategy profile and g∗ is the resulting network, the
payoff of a player is given by a
i (g) = Ii (g∗) − ci (g), (1)
where Ii (g∗) is the information received by i through the actual network g∗, and
ci (g) = cμdi (g) the cost incurred by i , where μdi (g) is the number of links i invests
in. Different models specify g∗ and Ii differently, but in all cases a game in strategic
form is specified: (GN , {i }i∈N ), where the Nash equilibrium10 stability notion can
be applied to strategy profiles.
The three basic models relating g∗ to g alluded to above are as follows:
(i) g∗i j := gmini j = min{gi j , g ji }. (2)
5 We often prefer the more neutral term “node” to avoid biased language.
6 Because the notation relative to graphs we use is standard, we minimize it and omit a cumbersome
exhaustive specification in this respect. For more details the reader is referred to Section 2 in Olaizola and
Valenciano (2015a).
7 In Olaizola and Valenciano (2015a) c < 1 is assumed to simplify the formulation of some results. This
assumption is removed here.
8 Although other interpretations are possible, we give preference to the interpretation in terms of informa-
tion.
9 In general, this value (and the cost of links) may differ for different pairs of players. But in order to keep
things as simple as possible we assume homogeneity of costs and values across players.
10 Bala and Goyal (2000a) also consider the stronger notion of strict Nash, a strategy profile where any
unilateral change of strategy means a loss.
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(i i) g∗i j := gi j . (3)
(i i i) g∗i j := gmaxi j = max{gi j , g ji }. (4)
Under assumption (2) only strong links, i.e. those supported by both players, actually
form. This is Jackson and Wolinsky’s bilateral link-formation model, where for a link
to be established both players must invest in it. Under assumption (3) a directed link
forms between two players as soon as one of them invests in it. Thus, in this case a
player can create directed links unilaterally. This is Bala and Goyal’s one-way flow
model. Finally, under (4) undirected links can be unilaterally created by players. This
is Bala and Goyal’s two-way flow model. Note that in the three models strong links
may form.
If every node receives intact the value of the players with whom it is connected in
g∗, then, according to each of these specifications of the resulting actual network, i.e.
whether g∗ is given by (2) or (3) or (4), the payoff of a player given by (1) becomes
respectively:
JWi (g) = μi (gmin) − μdi (g)c, (5)
BG1i (g) = −→μ i (g) − μdi (g)c. (6)
BG2i (g) = μi (gmax) − μdi (g)c (7)
where μi (gmin) (μi (gmax)) is the number of nodes connected to i by a path11 in
gmin(gmax), and −→μ i (g) is the number of nodes connected to i by an i-oriented path in
g. The model specified by (2) and (5) is a variation without decay,12 of Jackson and
Wolinsky’s connections model, i.e. assuming that the flow through a link of the actual
network is perfect or without loss. Similarly, (3) and (6) specify Bala and Goyal’s
one-way flow model without decay, while (4) and (7) specify Bala and Goyal’s two-
way flow model without decay. Observe that in all three models the strategy profile g
determines g∗ and the payoff of every player.
As a reference term, in each of these basic models we have the following results
relative to efficient (i.e. maximizing the aggregate payoff) and stable structures
where we make use of the following notions. K ⊂ N is a weak component/a
component/a strong component of g if for any two nodes i, j ∈ K , there is a
path/an i-oriented path/a path of strong links from j to i in g, and no subset of
N strictly containing K meets this condition. A strong component is isolated if
none of its nodes is involved in a weak link with a link in another component.
A network g is connected/weakly-connected/strongly-connected if N is the unique
connected/weakly-connected/strongly-connected component.13 A component is min-
11 A path from j to i in g is a sequence of distinct nodes whose first and last nodes are j and i , and any
two consecutive ones are connected by a link. If each link is supported by the player closest to i the path is
said to be i-oriented.
12 In fact, unlike Bala and Goyal (2000a), this case is not considered in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996),
where some decay is always assumed.
13 Usually the term “strongly connected” is applied to what we call “connected” (and “connected” to
what we call “weakly connected”), but the need to distinguish three levels of connectedness makes this
terminology helpful (note that strong connectedness ⇒ connectedness ⇒ weak connectedness).
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imal if the elimination of any link would increase the number of components in that
sense. The size of a component is the number of nodes from which it is formed, and if
it consists of a single node, it is a trivial component. A minimally strongly-connected
graph is a tree of strong links where any node in the tree can be seen as the root, i.e. a
reference node from which there is only one path connecting it with any other.
Proposition 1 In Jackson andWolinsky’s connections model without decay, with pay-
offs given by (5):
(i) The only efficient profiles are the empty profile and the minimally strongly-
connected profiles.
(ii) The nonempty Nash and strict Nash profiles are those where all links are strong
and all strong components are minimal.
(iii) The nonempty pairwise stable14 profiles are those minimally strongly-connected.
The proof can be seen, for instance, in Olaizola and Valenciano (2015a). As for
Bala and Goyal’s well-known results we have:
Proposition 2 (Bala and Goyal 2000a) In Bala and Goyal’s one-way flowmodel, with
payoffs given by (6):
(i) The only efficient profiles are the empty profile and the oriented wheel.15
(ii) The nonempty Nash profiles are those minimally connected.
(iii) The strict Nash profiles are oriented wheels.
In both models the turning point where the empty network becomes efficient occurs
when the other efficient structure also yields 0 aggregate payoff, which depends on c
and the number of players.
3 Transitional models
Thus, in terms of weak (singly-supported) vs. strong (doubly-supported) links, in
Jackson and Wolinsky’s (1996) connections model only strong links make sense as
they are the only ones that actually form, whereas in Bala and Goyal’s (2000a) one-
way and two-way flow models only weak links appear in efficient and stable strategy
profiles.A transition between Jackson andWolinsky’s (1996)modelwithout decay and
Bala andGoyal’s (2000a) two-wayflowmodel is possible by assuming that information
flows through strong links without friction in both directions, and through weak links
also in both directions but with some decay. If α (0 ≤ α ≤ 1) is the fraction of a
unit of information at a node that flows through a weak link, α = 0 means no flow
and maximal decay, while α = 1 means perfect flow and no decay. This is the model
14 Unlike the version considered here, in their original model links can only form with the agreement of
both players, and consequently they only consider pairwise stability. In a pairwise stable profile (Jackson
andWolinsky 1996) no player has an incentive to sever an existing link and no two players have an incentive
to form a new one.
15 An oriented wheel is a graph g s.t. for a certain permutation of the set of nodes, they form a strictly
oriented path whose extremes are also connected by an oriented link, so that any two nodes are connected
by a strictly oriented path, and no other link exists.
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introduced in Olaizola and Valenciano (2015a). Formally, in that model the actual
level of information flow from node j to node i through a link between them when the
players’ strategy profile is g, denoted by gJWBG2 is given by
gJWBG2i j := αgmaxi j + (1 − α)gmini j , (8)
with 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Thus the weighted graph gJWBG2 specifies the flow level through each
link for a profile in this model.
A similar transition between Jackson and Wolinsky’s (1996) model and Bala and
Goyal’s (2000a) one-way flow model is achieved by assuming that information runs
through a weak link only towards the node that supports it and with some decay α.
This is formally captured by replacing gmaxi j by gi j in (8), that is, by
gJWBG1i j := αgi j + (1 − α)gmini j , (9)
with 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, so that the weighted graph gJWBG1 specifies the flow level through
each link for a profile in this model.16
This motivates the notion of discounting length of a path from j to i in g, which
is the number of weak links in it. Then, the discounting distance from j to i in g,
denoted by λ(i, j; g), is defined as the discounting length of the path from j to i with





αλ(i, j;g) − cμdi (g), (10)
with 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, where N (i; g) denotes the set of nodes connected to i by a path.
Similarly, (9) motivates the notion of discounting oriented length of a path from
j to i in g , which is ∞ if the path is not i-oriented and otherwise is the number of
oriented weak links in it. The discounting oriented distance from j to i in g, denoted
by 	λ(i, j; g), is defined as the discounting oriented length of the path from j to i with
the shortest discounting oriented length. Note that this distance is not symmetric.





	λ(i, j;g) − cμdi (g), (11)
with 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. In the sequel we refer to the model specified by (8) and (10) as
“JWBG2 model”, and by “JWBG1 model ” to the one specified by (9) and (11).
16 A similar transition between the two models by Bala and Goyal (2000a) studied in Olaizola and
Valenciano (2014) is obtained by assuming:
gBG12i j := αgmini j + (1 − α)gmaxi j ,
but in this paper we concentrate on gJWBG1i j and g
JWBG2
i j link formation models.
123
264 SERIEs (2016) 7:257–278
Fig. 1 Transitional models
Figure 1 shows the “triangle” whose vertices are the benchmark models and its
sides the transitional models, and where the model specified in Footnote 16 is referred
to as “BG12 model”.
Example 1 Consider the strategy profile g given by the 5-node graph below, where a
strong link is represented by a thick segment, while a weak link is represented by a
thin segment only touching the node that supports it.
In JWBG2: player 1 receives a fraction α of the unit of information from players 2
and 3, a fraction α2 of the unit of information at 4, α3 from 5, and pays c for one
link. Thus player 1’s payoff is JWBG21 (g) = 2α + α2 + α3 − c. Similarly, JWBG22 (g) =
JWBG23 (g) = 1+ 2α +α2 − c, JWBG24 (g) = 3α +α2 − 2c, JWBG25 (g) = α + 2α2 +α3.
In JWBG1 the same profile yields different payoffs, namely: player 1 receives infor-
mation only from players 2 and 3, a fraction α of the unit of information at each of
these nodes, and pays for one link. Thus player 1’s payoff is JWBG11 (g) = 2α − c.
Similarly, JWBG12 (g) = JWBG13 (g) = 1 − c, JWBG14 (g) = 3α − 2c, JWBG15 (g) = 0.
Remark (i) In both JWBG2 and JWBG1 models, the decay matrix or weighted
graph (as given by (8) and (9)) encapsulates all the relevant information about the
flow through the network.
(ii) In both models, α = 0 yields gJWBG1 = gJWBG2 = gmin, i.e. Jackson and Wolin-
sky’s network formation model without decay; while for α = 1: gJWBG2 = gmax
(i.e. Bala and Goyal’s two-way flow model) and gJWBG1 = g (i.e. Bala and Goyal’s
one-way flow model).
(iii) Thus JWBG2 and JWBG1 represent two different transitional models, both
starting from Jackson and Wolinsky’s model without decay, but moving away in
different directions: each of them towards one of the two variants of Bala and
Goyal’s model.
(iv) In both transitional models, when a link is supported by both players gJWBGki j =
gJWBGkj i (g) = 1 (k = 1, 2), for all α. That is, information flows through strong links
without friction in both directions.
(v) In JWBG2 when only one player supports a link, say i , we have gJWBG2i j =
gJWBG2j i = α, i.e. flow through weak links occurs with decay in both directions.
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(vi) In JWBG1 when only one player supports a link, say i , gJWBG1i j = α and
gJWBG1j i = 0, i.e. flow through a weak link occurs with decay towards the only player
supporting it and there is no flow in the opposite direction
(vii) A comparison between these two transitional models leads to some general
remarks which are employed later: both models incorporate all possibilities of
Jackson and Wolinsky’s model without decay: strong links with 0-friction, but
their stability differs in each of the models. Strong links are less stable w.r.t. with-
drawal of support in JWBG2, where a weak link remains after withdrawal of
support by one player allowing information to flow in both directions, while in
JWBG1 no information flows through the remaining weak link toward the player
thatwithdraws support.As to the stability ofweak links, the situation is the opposite
(w.r.t. being doubled): weak links are more stable in JWBG2, where the incen-
tives for doubling them are smaller than in JWBG1. Concerning externalities, the
externalities of weak links are greater in JWBG2 than in JWBG1.
We now focus on the JWBG1model, but taking advantage of the results established
for JWBG2 in Olaizola and Valenciano (2015a, c). We first address the question of
efficiency and then that of stability with particular attention to the stability of efficient
networks.
4 Efficiency
The aggregate payoff of a network g is referred to as the value of the network and
denoted by v(g). A network g is said to dominate another g′ if v(g) ≥ v(g′). A
network is efficient if it dominates any other for a particular configuration of values
of the parameters. In the current setting we should refer to the efficiency of strategy
profiles rather than the efficiency of networks, given that different profiles may yield
the same actual network. Nevertheless, we refer to efficient (actual) networks,meaning
efficiently sustainable by efficient profiles.
We then have the following characterization of efficient networks in the JWBG2.
Proposition 3 (Olaizola andValenciano 2015c) In the JWBG2model with 0 ≤ α < 1,
the unique efficient networks are:
(i) The minimally strongly-connected ones if
c < min{n/2, n − 2α − (n − 2)α2}. (Region I in Figure 2)
(ii) The all-encompassing stars of weak links if
n − 2α − (n − 2)α2 < c < 2α + (n − 2)α2. (Region II in Figure 2)
(iii) The empty network if
c > max{n/2, 2α + (n − 2)α2}. (Region III in Figure 2)
123
266 SERIEs (2016) 7:257–278
The following lemma allows to draw some conclusions on efficiency in the JWBG1
model as a corollary.
Lemma 1 If g is an efficient network in the JWBG2 model that does not contain weak
links then it is also efficient in the JWBG1 model.
Proof Denote by vJWBG1(g) := ∑i∈N JWBG1i (g) and vJWBG2(g) =
∑
i∈N JWBG2i (g). Let
g be an efficient profile in JWBG2 without weak links. For any profile g′ we have
vJWBG1(g)
(a)= vJWBG2(g) (b)≥ vJWBG2(g′) (c)≥ vJWBG1(g′),
where (a)holdswhenever g has noweak links, (b)because g is efficient in JWBG2, and
(c) holds for any profile because in both models strong links work and cost the same,
while weak links in JWBG2 generate greater positive externalities than in JWBG1 at
the same cost. Thus, g is efficient also in JWBG1. unionsq
Then we have an immediate corollary from Proposition 3:
Corollary 1 In the JWBG1 model with 0 ≤ α < 1, the empty network and those min-
imally strongly-connected are also efficient within the regions where they are efficient
in the JWBG2 model.
Remark Note that, unlike Proposition 3, this corollary is not a characterization. It
just stems from Proposition 3 and the fact that a network without weak links which
is efficient in JWBG2 must be so in JWBG1, where networks containing weak links
yield smaller aggregate value than in JWBG2 because of their smaller value (α−c vs.
2α − c), and smaller externalities (they transmit in only one direction). Corollary 1
states that these structures continue to be efficient in regions I and III in Fig. 2, but it
is possible that they are efficient in JWBG1 in wider regions.
Fig. 2 Efficiency in JWBG2 (n = 20)
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Thus there only remains the question of efficient profiles in Region II in Fig. 2. Note
that this region contains the segment where 0 ≤ c ≤ n and α = 1, which corresponds
to Bala and Goyal’s two-way flow model without decay in JWBG2 (where efficient
networks are those minimally weakly-connected), while in JWBG1 corresponds to
Bala and Goyal’s one-way flow model without decay, where oriented wheels are the
only efficient structures. Thus one can expect efficient networks containing cycles17 in
Region II. In fact, as we presently show, oriented wheels can yield a greater aggregate
value than minimally strongly-connected networks in this region. This occurs for an
n-node oriented wheel if:
n
(
α + α2 + · · · + αn−1
)
− nc > (n − 1)(n − 2c),




n − 1 −
(
α + α2 + · · · + αn−1
))
, (12)
which is a concave function decreasing on α, whose value is n(n − 1)/(n − 2) for
α = 0, and 0 for α = 1. It can be easily seen that for α ∈ (0, 1) this curve cuts across
Region II above c = n − 1 − 2α − (n − 2)α2, which according to Corollary 1 is the
lower boundary ofRegion II. In other words: above (12) orientedwheels yield a greater
aggregate payoff thanminimally strongly-connected networks, and below this line and
beyond Region I, where they are proven to be efficient, minimally strongly-connected
networks still beat the wheel.
We have not been able to characterize efficient networks within Region II. Never-
theless, the following counterexample contradicts the conjecture according to which
oriented wheels would be the only nonempty efficient structures in Region II.
Example 2 Let g1 be a 5-node oriented wheel and g2 a 5-node network consisting of
two 3-node oriented triangles sharing a node. Then, it is easy to check that v(g2) −
v(g1) = α + 3α2 − α3 − 3α4 − c. Then, wheel g1 is beaten by 2-cycle network g2
whenever c < α + 3α2 − α3 − 3α4, which leaves room for c for all α ∈ (0, 1) given
that the right-hand term is positive for all α ∈ (0, 1).
5 Stability
As in the JWBG2model, in the JWBG1model both a strictly non-cooperative approach
and one admitting (or requiring) bilateral agreements to form new strong links make
sense. We therefore examine the question of stability from two points of view: one
purely non-cooperative, focusing on Nash and strict Nash equilibrium, and the other
allowing for pairwise formation of links. Note that in the transitional models the set of
options available to any player is richer than in Jackson andWolinsky’s setting, where
the only unilateral move is severing a link. A player can now create a new weak link
17 A graph g is acyclic or contains no cycles if there is no sequence of 3 or more distinct nodes, such that
any two consecutive nodes and also the first and last ones are connected by a link.
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or make an existing weak one strong. Although a weaker version is possible, we use a
strong version of the pairwise stability notion referred to in the literature as pairwise
Nash stability, which in fact refines both the Nash equilibrium and pairwise stability.18
A strategy profile g is pairwise Nash stable if it is a Nash equilibrium and no pair of
players has incentives to form a new strong link. When the results and their proofs
are very similar to those in Olaizola and Valenciano (2015a), we omit the proofs,
emphasize the differences and concentrate on the intuition behind them.
5.1 Stability for c < 1
The following lemma utilizes some remarks made in Sect. 3 comparing JWBG2 and
JWBG1 models to transfer stability results for JWBG2 established in Olaizola and
Valenciano (2015a) to JWBG1.
Lemma 2 Let g be a strategy profile without weak links. Then: (i) If g is a Nash
(strict Nash) profile in the JWBG2 model, then g is also a Nash (strict Nash) profile
in the JWBG1 model; (i i) If g is a pairwise Nash profile in the JWBG2 model, then g
is also a pairwise Nash profile in the JWBG1 model.
Proof Assume that g, without weak links, is a Nash profile in JWBG2. If g is empty,
then no player has incentives to create a weak link nor do any pair of players have
incentives to form a strong one, but then the same must be true in JWBG1.
If g consists of strong links only, no cycles are possible and no player involved in a
strong link has incentives to break it, but then the same must be true in JWBG1, since
a weak link remains after withdrawal of support by one player in JWBG2, while in
JWBG1 no information flows through the remaining weak link toward the player that
withdraws support. As for forming new weak or strong links, if there are no incentives
to form any in JWBG2 the same must be true in JWBG1, given that an improvement
achieved by a weak link in JWBG2 can be mimicked by a weak link in JWBG1, and
new strong ones are equally feasible in both if pairwise coordination is assumed. The
same holds for strict Nash profiles and pairwise Nash profiles only containing strong
links. unionsq
The following proposition characterizes stable architectureswithin the region below
the line c = 1 − α.
Proposition 4 In the JWBG1 model, with 0 < α < 1 and 0 < c < 1 − α :
(i) If c ≥ α, a profile is Nash (strict Nash) stable if and only if it is minimally
strongly-connected or otherwise if all links are strong, all strong components are
minimal, and the maximal size of a strong component is less than or equal to
(strictly less than) c/α.
18 This strong version of pairwise stabilitywas suggested by Jackson andWolinsky (1996) in the concluding
discussion of their stability notion, and applied byGoyal and Joshi (2003) andBelleflammeandBloch (2004)
among others. See also Bloch and Jackson (2006) for a discussion of different notions of equilibrium in
network formation and references therein.
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(ii) If c < α, a profile is Nash stable if and only if it is minimally strongly-connected;
moreover such a profile is also strict Nash stable.
(iii) For the whole range of values, a profile is pairwise Nash stable if and only if it
is minimally strongly-connected.
The proof of an identical result for JWBG2 [Proposition 3 in Olaizola and Valen-
ciano (2015a)] can be replicated in JWBG1 and is omitted. But note that, apart from the
uniqueness (i.e. the “only if” part), the stability follows from that result and Lemma 2.
Thus Proposition 4 characterizes the Nash, strict Nash and pairwise Nash stable
architectures within the region c < 1 − α. Indeed, unlike in JWBG2, the same
structures remain stable above the line c = 1− α as far as c < 1, but they are not the
only ones which are stable above this line as we shall show presently. The following
lemma allows a partial characterization above that line and below c = 1.
Lemma 3 In the JWBG1 model with 0 < α < 1 and 1−α ≤ c < 1, in a Nash profile
any link which is not part of a cycle is necessarily strong. In particular, peripheral19
players are connected by strong links.
Proof Let g be a Nash profile and let i and j be two players connected by a weak link
which is not part of any cycle. Assume i is the only node supporting it, then j receives
no information from i , while if j makes the link strong at a cost c < 1, j improves its
payoff in at least 1 − c > 0 , which contradicts g being a Nash profile. unionsq
Comment Note that this is false in JWBG2, where no cycle is possible in a Nash
profile, and where above the line c = 1 − α a strong link connecting a peripheral
node is unstable (the non peripheral player supporting it would have incentives for
withdrawing its support). This is an important difference between these two models,
which makes tree core-periphery profiles20 unstable above c = 1 − α in JWBG1.
Unlike in JWBG2 we have:
Proposition 5 In the JWBG1 model, with 0 < α < 1 and 1 − α ≤ c < 1, then (i) ,
(i i) and (i i i) in Proposition 4 remain true if it is assumed that the profile contains no
cycles.
Proof Assume g is a Nash profile with no cycles. By Lemma 3, within this range of
values of α and c all links are strong, and no superfluous link would be supported.
Therefore all strong components are minimal. Then the proof of (i), (ii) and (iii)
follows the same steps as in Proposition 3 in Olaizola and Valenciano (2015a). unionsq
Remark (i) Figure 3 illustrates the situation described by Propositions 4 and 5. The
left-hand side of the rectangle, i.e. α = 0, represents a version of Jackson and
Wolinsky’s connectionsmodelwithout decay,whereNash and strictNashprofiles
19 A node is peripheral in a graph g if it is involved in a single link (weak or strong).
20 In Olaizola and Valenciano (2015a) it is shown that above the line c = 1 − α “tree-core-periphery”
profiles, which consist of an all-encompassing tree whose terminal or peripheral nodes support weak links
and all other links are strong, appear as Nash networks.
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Fig. 3 Stability (c < 1)
are those where all links are strong and all strong components are minimal, and
pairwise Nash stable profiles are those which are minimally strongly-connected.
In region S, above c = sα, all minimally strongly-connected profiles as well
as those described in Proposition 4-(i), where the size of the greatest strong
component is less than or equal to (strictly less than) s, are Nash (strict Nash)
stable. Moreover, below the straight line c = 1 − α these are the only Nash
(strict Nash) structures, while above that line they are the only Nash (strict Nash)
structures without cycles. As one moves right, i.e. as α increases, from the side
α = 0, all the structures characterized in Proposition 1-(ii) as Nash and strict
Nash when α = 0 remain strict Nash as long as the largest strong component (if
the profile is not strongly-connected) is not large enough to make if profitable
for any player in another component to form a weak link with any player in it
(i.e. if it is smaller than c/α). When c/α > 1 but this value is very close to 1,
apart fromminimally strongly-connected profiles only the empty network -where
all strong components are singletons- remains strict Nash among such profiles.
Beyond that point, i.e., when c < α and c < 1−α, the only Nash and strict Nash
stable profiles are those minimally strongly-connected. The same is true when
c ≥ 1 − α if we confine our attention to profiles with no cycles.
(ii) Only minimally strongly-connected profiles are pairwise Nash stable below the
line c = 1 − α, and the same is true above that line for strategy profiles without
cycles. But in view of Proposition 4-( ii) and Proposition 5, below the line c = α
pairwise Nash stability adds nothing to (i.e. does not refine) Nash stability, given
that in this case bilateral coordination is irrelevant because it does not really offer
new chances to the players.
(iii) A comparison with the results in Olaizola and Valenciano (2015a) for the same
region is pertinent here. Below the line c = 1 − α the results are the same as in
Olaizola and Valenciano (2015a). However, above c = 1−α the results diverge.
In the current model the same structures remain stable as far as c < 1, which is
not the case in Olaizola and Valenciano (2015a) above c = 1 − α. Indeed new
different structures appear in each model, as becomes clear when Proposition 5
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is compared with the results in Olaizola and Valenciano (2015a). This difference
is enhanced by the discussion in Sect. 5.3.
5.2 Stability for c > 1
The following simple lemma has strong consequences.
Lemma 4 In the JWBG1 model with 0 < α < 1 and c > 1, in a Nash profile
peripheral players are connected by weak links supported by them.
Proof Let g be a Nash profile. Assume i is peripheral in g and j is the only node with
which i is involved in a link. As c > 1, if j supported this link i’s reward for it would
be 1 − c or α − c, depending on whether gi j = 1 or gi j = 0, but in both cases less
than 0. Thus the only link in which i is involved must be weak and supported by i . unionsq
In view of this, above the line c = 1, in equilibrium peripheral players must be
harmlessly parasitical: they receive enough for them to be worth paying for the con-
nection, but they contribute nothing to others’ welfare. Note also that all the structures
whose stability below the line c = 1 has been established in Propositions 4 and 5 are
not stable above this line, because the nodes supporting strong links with peripheral
nodes of a tree would withdraw support for them as soon as c > 1. But, as shown in
5.1, other structures may be stable above the line c = 1 − α, for instance, oriented
wheels. Moreover, as a consequence of Lemma 4 we have the following corollary:
Corollary 2 In the JWBG1 model, with 0 < α < 1 and c > 1, a nonempty Nash
profile necessarily contains cycles.
Proof Assume g is a nonemptyNash network. If g contains no cycles itmust be formed
by one or more trees. Without loss of generality, assume g is a tree. By Lemma 4,
its peripheral nodes must be connected by weak links supported by them. Let P(g)
be the set of peripheral players in g, and consider the subgraph that results from
eliminating them. Given that peripheral players in that subgraph receive nothing from
those peripheral ones in g, they must also support their weak links. By reiterating this
reasoning, after a finite number of steps a stage must be reached where one is left
with either one or two nodes. In the first case, those that support links with the single
remaining node receive α < 1 and pay c > 1 for it, which contradicts the notion that
g is a Nash network. In the second case, neither player has an incentive to form either
a weak or a strong link, which is a contradiction. unionsq
Thus, above c = 1 stability entails the existence of cycles.
5.3 Stability with cycles
By Lemma 3, above the line c = 1−α, when c < 1 in equilibrium all links are strong
unless there are cycles. Nevertheless, when c ≥ 1− α weak links may actually occur
in equilibrium if there are cycles. The following discussion shows that the stability of
oriented wheels (i.e. the only strict Nash architecture for Bala and Goyal’s one-way
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flow model without decay) when c < 1 is confined to a region close to α = 1, i.e. to
Bala and Goyal’s one-way flow model. Consider the n-player profile consisting of n
weak links which form an oriented wheel. No node has an incentive to sever the one
link that it is supporting out of the two in which it is involved and to double the other
one if
α + α2 + α3 + · · · + αn−2 + αn−1 ≥ 1. (13)
Condition (13) sets a lower bound for α. In particular, if c < 1, this implies
α + α2 + α3 + · · · + αn−2 + αn−1 ≥ c, (14)
which means that no node is interested in severing the only link that it supports.
No player has an incentive to double a weak link if
α + α2 + α3 + · · · + αn−2 + αn−1 − c ≥ 1 + α + α2 + α3 + · · · + αn−2 − 2c,
that is, if
c ≥ 1 − αn−1. (15)
Therefore, (13) and (15) are necessary conditions for an n-player oriented wheel to
be stable. Note that the greater the number of players, the less constraining the first
condition becomes and the more constraining the latter will be. In general, these
conditions are not sufficient. For instance, in a wheel with enough nodes it may be
advantageous for a node to initiate a link with the node furthest away: assume for
instance that n is odd, i.e. n = 2m + 1 for an integer m, N = {i0, i1, . . . , i2m} and
gi1i0 = gi2i1 = · · · = gi2mi2m−1 = gi0i2m = 1. Then i0 has no incentive to initiate a
link with im if
α + α2 + α3 + · · · + α2m−1 + α2m − c ≥ 2α + 2α2 + · · · + 2αm − 2c,
that is, if
c ≥ α(1 − αm)(α + α2 + · · · + αm). (16)
When the number of players increases, this and previous conditions considerably
constrain the region where an oriented wheel can be stable. Part of region S below
c = 1 in Fig. 4 illustrates this for n = 9. Condition (13) sets a lower bound on α,
and its boundary is represented by a vertical dashed line, while the other two, (15)
and (16),21 set lower bounds for c relative to α. Therefore, these necessary conditions
constrain the possible stability of oriented wheels to two regions within the area where
c < 1 (their boundaries are shown in thick lines on the figure): a narrow strip close
to α = 1 (i.e. to Bala and Goyal’s one-way flow model), along with a small piece
21 Pairwise stability imposes a stronger condition similar to (16).
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Fig. 4 Oriented wheel stability: necessary conditions (n = 9)
between (13) and (16) (there is always room between) and above (15), which as n
increases shrinks to a small patch close to (α, c) = (1/2, 1).22
By Corollary 2, above c = 1 stability entails the existence of cycles. By examining
the necessary conditions for an oriented wheel to be stable discussed for c > 1 we
have the following. Condition (13) sets a lower bound on α, but it is implied by (14)
when c > 1. Thus (14) is now a stringent condition which sets an upper bound on c,
whereas conditions (15) and (16), set lower bounds on c. But now (15) holds trivially
(it is implied by c > 1). Thus we are left with two necessary conditions (14) and (16),
which, as part of region S above c = 1 in Fig. 4 shows, hold in a rather wide area.
On the other hand, it is clear that as the number of players in a cycle increases
new conditions of the type of (16) for a cycle forming part of a stable network will
appear, and presumably more complex structures with multiple cycles may arise and
prove to be stable. Nevertheless, whenever cycles are feasible characterizations are
problematic and we have not been able to obtain further results.23 Nevertheless, the
following example shows that cycles are actually feasible in equilibrium.
22 A comparison with the transitional model studied in Olaizola and Valenciano (2014) is pertinent here.
In that model, where it is assumed c < 1, as the number of players increases the region where the oriented
wheel is stable widens. The reason is clear, in that transitional model weak links work one-way without
friction and with some decay in the opposite, while here only strong links work without friction and both
ways.
23 Bala and Goyal (2000a) have no characterization of stable structures for their one-way flow model with
decay.
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Fig. 5 Oriented 4-node wheel stability
Example 3 If n = 4, and g consists of 4 links: 12, 23, 34 and 41. Conditions (13) and
(15) become:
α + α2 + α3 ≥ 1 and c ≥ 1 − α3.
As to condition (16), no player has an incentive to initiate a new link with the node at
the opposite corner of the “square” if: α + α2 + α3 − c ≥ 2α + α2 − 2c, that is, if
c ≥ α − α3.
But this is implied by c ≥ 1−α3. In fact, it can easily be shown that if conditions (13)
and (15) hold no change of strategy by a single node improves its payoff. Thus, these
conditions are necessary and sufficient for the 4-node oriented wheel to be a Nash
network (strict Nash if both conditions hold strictly). Pairwise Nash stability further
requires that no two nodes between which no link exists benefit from creating a strong
one, that is α + α2 + α3 − c ≥ 1 + 2α − 2c, or
c ≥ 1 + α − α2 − α3. (17)
Figure 5 shows the region (S1 and S2) where conditions (13) and (15) hold and the
4-node oriented wheel is Nash (strict Nash in the interior): to the right of line (13) and
above curve (15). Finally, the 4-node oriented wheel is pairwise Nash stable above
curve (17), thick dashed in the figure (region S2).
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6 Dynamics
Bala and Goyal (2000a) provide a dynamic model that converges to strict Nash net-
works for the one-way flow model without decay. They consider a sequential form
of best response dynamics: in each period one player chosen at random plays a best
response while all other players continue to support their links. This yields a Markov
chain on the state space of all networks. They prove that this dynamic model con-
verges to an oriented wheel, the only strict Nash architecture for the one-way flow
model without decay.
We only address the question of convergence of sequential dynamics for values
of the parameters within the only region where a full characterization of strict Nash
profiles has been achieved, i.e. only for c < 1 − α. We have the following:
Proposition 6 In the JWBG1 model, with 0 < α < 1 and c < 1 − α, sequential best
response dynamics converge to a strict Nash network with probability 1.
Given that this result (and its proof) is entirely similar to Proposition 12 in Olaizola
and Valenciano (2015a), we do not repeat all the details here. The intuition of why
this is so is the following. Strict Nash networks in this region are the same in both
models and consist of strong links only. As commented in remark (vii) in Sect. 3,
strong links are more stable in the JWBG1 model than in the JWBG2 model, while
for weak links the situation is the opposite. Thus it is not surprising that the same
dynamics leads to the same absorbing states. However, to ensure that the paper is
basically self-contained, an informal description of the way in which a sequence of
best responses is produced starting from any strategy profile that yields a strict Nash
profile is given below. A natural modification of the sequential best response dynamics
consistent with a scenario where pairwise coordination is possible is the following:
in each period a player may either play a best response or propose the formation
of a new strong link to one player. This “extended” best response dynamics ensures
convergence to a pairwise Nash stable profile by merely letting players keep playing
once a strict Nash profile is reached until the resulting profile is strongly-connected.
Outline of the proof of Proposition 6:
1. After a best response from an arbitrary node i : (1) the set of nodes in the strong
component of the resulting profile containing i contains the set of nodes in the
strong component containing i in the previous profile; (2) no further best response
will ever break a strong link in which i is involved; (3) any weak link supported
by i belongs to a different strong component [similar to Lemma 7 in Olaizola and
Valenciano (2015a)].
2. Therefore, if after an arbitrary player plays a best response another player in the
same (new) strong component plays another, after a finite number of steps all
players in a strong component must be playing best responses. Then either the
component is isolated or one of its nodes supports a weak link with a node j in
a different strong component. In the latter case, let j play a best response and
restart the sequence. In this way after a finite number of best responses an isolated
strong component C is generated. [see Procedure 1 and Claim 1, in Olaizola and
Valenciano (2015a)].
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3. At the end of the sequence described in 2, there are two possible cases: either
#C ≥ c/α or not. In the latter case, apply the sequence described in 2 starting with
a node in a different strong component. Reiterate the process until a component
of size ≥ c/α is generated or, otherwise, a profile consisting of isolated strong
components smaller than c/α is generated. In the second case, a strict Nash profile
is obtained [Algorithm 1, Claim 2 in Olaizola and Valenciano (2015a)]. Otherwise
proceed as follows:
4. If at the end of 3 a strong component greater than or equal in size to c/α is obtained,
then it is easy to show that a sequence of best responses exists that yields a profile
consisting of a unique minimally strongly-connected component, i.e. a minimally
strongly-connected profile, which is strict Nash in the whole region [Lemma 8 in
Olaizola and Valenciano (2015a)].
7 Conclusion
The model presented in this paper completes a “triangle” whose vertices are three
benchmarkmodels of strategic formation of networks: the no-decay version of Jackson
andWolinsky’s (1996) connectionsmodel, and Bala andGoyal’s (2000a) one-way and
two-way flow models without decay. Summing up, the transition from the no-decay
version of Jackson and Wolinsky’s (1996) connections model (case α = 0 in ours) to
Bala and Goyal’s (2000a) one-way flow model without decay (case α = 1 in ours)
has similarities with the transition to Bala and Goyal’s (2000a) two-way flow model
studied in Olaizola and Valenciano (2015a), but also important differences.
In the JWBG1 model studied here, for c < 1 − α everything is entirely similar to
what occurs in the JWBG2 model in Olaizola and Valenciano (2015a). In both cases,
there is a smooth extension of the results in Jackson and Wolinsky’s connections
model in these regions. The stability of each stable profile for Jackson andWolinsky’s
connections model without decay extends up to a point: the moment when the greatest
strong component is enough to make the profile unstable. In both models, for c < α,
the only Nash, strict Nash and pairwise Nash stable profiles are those minimally
strongly-connected.
By contrast, for c ≥ 1−α results differ from those in JWBG2. In both models, only
stable architectures without cycles have been characterized. In the model considered
here, the line c = 1−α has no impact on the stability of the stable structures below it,
which remain stable above it. But in JWBG2 above this line peripheral players must
necessarily be connected through weak links in equilibrium, giving rise to the tree-
core-periphery architectures. In JWBG2 the existence of cycles in equilibrium above
this line is not confirmed, while in JWBG1 their existence is established for c < 1,
and their necessity is proved for c > 1 (Sect. 5.3). Nevertheless, no characterization
has been obtained.
As to efficiency, Lemma 1makes it possible to transfer straightforwardly to JWBG1
(Corollary 1) part of the characterizing result in JWBG2. Finally, the dynamic models
discussed in Sect. 7 prove convergence to strict Nash and to pairwise Nash stable
profiles in the region where the characterization of strict Nash and pairwise Nash
stable profiles is complete, i.e. 0 < α < 1, c < 1 − α.
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A criticism similar to that leveled at the model in Olaizola and Valenciano (2015a)
applies here too. In one sense, although the model actually bridges the two extreme
models, corresponding to α = 0 and α = 1, the intermediate model lacks symmetry.
The assumption that flow through strong links is always frictionless amounts to over-
lapping the no-decay version of Jackson and Wolinsky’s model and Bala and Goyal’s
(2000a) one-way flow model with decay.
Some issues remain open. No example of “mixed” profile, i.e. containing bothweak
and strong links, efficient or stable has been provided, nor has the question of their
existence or non-existence been settled.
An interesting line of further research could be to parallel the study conducted
in Olaizola and Valenciano (2015b), which actually bridges the gap between Jackson
andWolinsky’s (1996) connectionsmodel and Bala andGoyal’s (2000a) one-way flow
model, both with decay. Note that JWBG1 is consistent with a situation in which links
supported by two players transmit a fraction δ of the unit of information at each node,
while links supported by only one player transmit a fraction α ≤ δ and only towards
the player that supports the link. The model developed here is a stylized version which
considers δ = 1, that is, links supported by both players work perfectly. Another
potentially interesting issue would be exploring the interior of the triangle of models
represented in Fig. 1.
Beyond these possible extensions, and of a more immediate interest, is the question
of the applicability of the model. In this respect, it is interesting to mention a recent
work of Comola and Fafchamps (2014) where they test the true nature of links in
networks based by self-reported links from survey data.24 They “ propose a method
for testing whether survey responses can safely be interpreted as a link and, if so,
whether links are generated by a unilateral or bilateral link formation process”. They
even propose a “hybrid model” for the test with an additional parameter δ to represent
the extent to which each respondent internalizes the other’s desire to link in his survey
response. “If δ = 1, this boils down to the bilateral link formation model. In contrast,
if δ = 0, the second term in the right-hand side becomes a constant and the regression
boils down to the desire-to-link model.” The completely different settings, one where
networks are based on empirical survey data and another where networks are based on
an abstract model, only make the parallelism more remarkable and gives a hint about
the model’s potential.
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